This note generalizes the Solow-Stiglitz efficiency condition for natural resources to the problem of fossil fuel extraction with a greenhouse effect. The generalized optimality condition suggests that the greenhouse effect implies overextraction in the sense of leaving future generations a wrongly composed wealth portfolio with too few natural resources relative to man-made capital. This judgment is independent of society's ethical preferences concerning the well-being of future generations.
Introduction
A forward-looking society has to solve two fundamental economic problems. It has to decide how much wealth it wants to transfer from the present to the future and how its wealth portfolio of natural resources and man-made capital is to be composed, given that natural resources can be extracted and transformed into capital by means of producing investment goods. While the analysis of the first decision requires assumptions about society's intertemporal preferences including difficult ethical considerations concerning the proper weight to be given to future generations, the second decision is potentially simpler insofar as technological efficiency conditions that make use of the principle of Pareto optimality may suffice.
For the case of exhaustible natural resources that have zero extraction costs, that serve as factors of production and that produce no environmental waste, Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) have solved the wealth composition problem by showing that the speed of resource extraction should be chosen such that the marginal product of the natural resource grows at a rate that equals the marginal product of capital. The Solow-Stiglitz condition is a necessary condition for Pareto optimality because when this condition is satisfied, it is impossible to increase consumption of man-made goods in one period of time without decreasing it in another.
As is well known, the Solow-Stiglitz condition is the market analogue of a rule derived by Hotelling (1931) which describes the behavior of well-functioning competitive markets for natural resources with perfect foresight. According to Hotelling's rule, the price of the exhaustible resource will grow at a rate that is equal to the market rate of interest, for if not, wealth maximizing resource owners would shift extraction from periods with low to periods with high discounted prices until any differences between the discounted prices have disappeared. Hotelling's rule coincides with the Solow-Stiglitz efficiency condition when the market rate of interest equals the marginal product of capital and the price of the natural resource equals the marginal product of the resource.
The Solow-Stiglitz condition was derived a quarter of a century ago when the Meadows report (Meadows et al. 1972) had alerted the world of the problem of the exhaustibility of natural resources shortly before the 1973 oil crisis. Recently, the Stern report (Stern et al. 2006) has alerted the world of the huge costs in terms of lost GDP resulting from the greenhouse effect that the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is causing, arguing that this effect is "the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen" (p. 1). It now appears that the greenhouse effect is not just a side aspect of the extraction of fossil fuels but of paramount importance for the economics of resource extraction. As the stock of carbon is gradually taken out of the ground, the stock of carbon dioxide accumulates in the air, and possibly the limited absorption capacity of the latter will slow down the extraction of fossil fuels more and earlier than the limited availability of the former. There is a double stock adjustment problem for natural resources, and a triple one in society's portfolio problem:
Society has to decide on how much man-made capital, how many unused fossil fuels and how much waste in the form of carbon dioxide it wants to bequeath to future generations.
This note extends the Solow-Stiglitz efficiency condition to the case of counterproductive effects resulting from the accumulation of a stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. In the spirit of the Stern report, global warming is seen as technological problem that creates measurable damage in terms of lost growth as well as protection and reaction costs. Think for example of the dykes, the new buildings, the air conditioning and dislocation costs that a change in the world climate would require. As the protection and reaction cost reduces the output remaining for investment and consumption, the quality of the environment in the sense of additional carbon dioxide being absent from the atmosphere can be seen as an argument of the aggregate production function. The note also incorporates stock-dependent extraction costs to take account of the fact that the resources lie in different sites with different site-specific extraction costs. Following Kemp and Long (1980) and Sinn (1981 Sinn ( , 1984 , it is assumed that the sequence of extraction is in the inverse order of the site-specific extraction costs.
The problem of economic growth with depletable resources and the accumulation of waste in the atmosphere has been studied by a number of authors in rich intertemporal optimization models. See, in particular, Krautkraemer (1985 Krautkraemer ( , 1998 , Kolstad and Krautkraemer (1993) and Withagen (1995) . While this literature thoroughly analysed the implications of environmental variables on the growth process and derived interesting conclusions, it has not explicitly addressed the question of intertemporal Pareto optimality.
Moreover, it typically assumed waste to be an argument of the utility rather than the production function, to capture the role of environmental amenities. The model used here comes closer to a special variant of a more general intertemporal setting that Kamien and Schwartz (1982, p. 58 ) once described. Kamien and Schwartz treat resource extraction as a factor of production and include the stock of the accumulated waste as an argument in the production function. However they do not derive the conditions for Pareto optimality.
The Model
Let S be the stock of (reduced, oxidizable) carbon underground, R the current flow of carbon extraction and P the accumulated stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. To keep things simple, assume a given mix of fossil fuels and hence a given energy output per unit of carbon or carbon dioxide.
1 Assume moreover that a given fraction of the produced carbon dioxide is absorbed by the oceans and the biomasses on land.
where a is some initial stock of P, b is a technological parameter following from the laws of organic chemistry, geology and meteorology, and 0 S is the initial stock of S. Thus, without loss of generality, the economy's output Y net of the damage caused by the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can be taken to be given by a neo-classical production function
(1) ( , , , )
where K is the stock of capital and t indicates the time period. It is assumed that , , 0
Note that the resource in situ, S, can be treated like a production factor since the damage from carbon dioxide is smaller the larger the stock of carbon that is not extracted. In fact, S can be interpreted as a measure of environmental quality so that (1) Equations (1) 
As the perturbation is limited to periods t* and t*+1,
captures the endogenous change in the oceanic and land-biological absorption processes. Using (7) - (10), equation (6) 
This equation shows that, in general, consumption in period t*+1 will change after the 
Equation (13) gives the marginal condition for a Pareto optimal resource extraction policy with global warming and stock dependent extraction costs.
Interpretation
To interpret the optimality condition consider first the Solow-Stiglitz case where
Equation (13) Next, allow for damages resulting from the accumulated stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, while continuing to neglect extraction costs. Equation (13) (1 )
Suppose, society chooses between two strategies of generating additional consumption in 11 period t*+1 by way of extracting one additional unit of carbon. The first is the capitalist strategy: The additional unit of carbon is extracted for productive purposes right away in period t* , and the additional output is invested so as to produce more consumption goods in t*+1. The other is the green strategy: The additional unit of carbon is extracted later, in period t*+1, and is then used to generate more consumption goods directly, without the detour via investment. The additional consumption goods generated by the capitalist strategy are (1 )
Thus, without government intervention, the green strategy is clearly better at the margin.
Condition (17) implies that the marginal product of the resource rises too quickly relative to what the marginal product of capital and the marginal environmental benefit of the resource in situ demand. This means that the extraction path is too steep, with too much extraction in the present and a too rapid decline over time. Because of "the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen", to repeat the words of the Stern report, society chooses a suboptimal composition of the wealth portfolio that it transfers to future generations with too little natural capital relative to man-made capital.
3
Consider now the case where stock dependent extraction costs are added. This is the case captured by equation (13) 
The common denominator of the terms on the right-hand side reflects the fact that with marginal extraction costs of size (14) and (15), the return is now measured in terms of the relative increase in the marginal product of resource input in production net of marginal extraction costs. The second term measures the rate of return from an improved environmental quality as reflected by a temporarily higher resource stock, the global warming effect. The third term measures a further rate of return from resource conservation resulting from the fact that a period ahead marginal extraction costs will be lower as more of the more easily accessible sites remain available. While the formula is significantly more complicated than before, the role of the environmental externality does not change, having the same qualitative implications for a judgment about the optimality of market processes as explained above. As the extraction cost terms entering the formula reflect private costs with no externalities involved, it remains true that market forces extract the resource faster than would be Pareto optimal.
Note finally that a simplification is possible without much loss of generality if a continuous-time formulation is chosen and marginal extraction cost is assumed to depend only on the stock in situ with unit extraction costs ( ), 0 g S g′ < , such that ( , ) ( ) X S R g S R = .
With continuous time, equation (18) becomes
, and rearranging terms gives
Concluding remarks
This note has shown that the stock externality resulting from the increased concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere plays an important role in the conditions for intertemporal Pareto externality, reducing the efficient rate of increase in the marginal product of carbon consumption below what otherwise would have been optimal. As this externality is not taken into account by market forces society hands future generations a wrongly composed wealth portfolio with a too little stock of the resource in situ relative to the stock of man-made capital.
In a general sense, this implication is not surprising. After all, it is a common political premise that the damages caused by global warming imply that carbon extraction should be reduced. The political initiatives in this regard range from the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997 to the G8 Summit in Heiligendamn in 2007. However, not all reasons given in the public and scholarly debates can be subsumed under the argument presented here.
For example, the normative result derived does not hinge on the assumption of adjustment costs (Quiggin and Horowitz 2003) or option values (Krutilla and Fisher 1975) which might make conservation a wise strategy. Neither does it follow from intergeneration equity considerations or philosophical arguments that would legitimate the use of a lower discount rate than markets do (Anand and Sen 2000; Solow 1974, p. 9; Stern et. al. 2006, Annex to chapter 2). In fact, the result is extremely robust insofar as it simply depends on the principle of Pareto optimality which is about the weakest welfare criterion available.
Rawlsians, Musgravian believers in intergeneration equity or non-discounters alike should agree to the goal of increasing consumption in one period or for one generation without reducing it for another, and this goal is enough to prove overextraction when there is a positive stock externality of the resource in situ.
Note, though, that the Pareto conditions derived do not lend themselves to defend extreme conservationist views. They do not imply that some of the carbon be permanently preserved, but only that the extraction be postponed. To make the argument for permanent preservation, much stronger assumptions about intertemporal preferences, the size of the available stock and limiting properties of the production function would be needed than were made in this note. Postponing extraction does not mean that some of the carbon available in the earth's crust should never be used. It only means that measures are appropriate to reduce the speed of extraction and global warming. It is this sense only in which this note supports the recommendations of the Stern report as well as other environmentalist concerns.
